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Abstract 
Advocates of an increased focus on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives
have argued that increased ESG disclosure is a necessary first step. Given the limited regulatory
requirements on ESG disclosure, manager preferences serve as a primary determinant of ESG
transparency. Using data on ESG disclosure from Bloomberg, I examine the extent to which
disclosure persistence on the behalf of firm management, as proxied by managerial tenure,
affects firms’ ESG disclosure strategies. Overall, I find that ESG disclosure quality and ESG
disclosure variability are reduced as management tenure increases. Further, I find that the 
replacement of a firm’s CEO interrupts disclosure persistence, e.g., median ESG disclosure 
scores increase roughly 9.7% in the two years following the replacement of a firm’s CEO. The 
results of this study highlight one inhibitor, i.e., persistence, to inducing more complete, 
transparent ESG disclosure. 
JEL Classification: M41, M48, G18, G38, Q56 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility; sustainability; ESG disclosure; persistence; executive tenure 
Introduction 
The maxim, “If you can measure it, you can manage it,” or some variation thereof, is a common idiom used in a 
myriad of business situations. Increasingly, the sentiment has been applied within the context of corporate
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives (Doda, Gennaioli, Gouldson, Grover, and Sullivan, 2015).
The question of what, exactly, should be measured or reported is a philosophical endeavor. From an implementation 
perspective, however, a significant challenge in obtaining ESG data is that the thorough collection of the data, at least 
for U.S. firms, is predicated upon firm managers electing to voluntarily disclose ESG information. For most firms, 
managers are granted great leeway with respect to their ESG disclosure strategies (Sullivan and Gouldson, 2007;
Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari, 2008). Advocates for the enhancement, or expansion, of ESG initiatives argue
that increased ESG disclosure is a necessary first step as requiring an organization to reveal ESG information will
induce stakeholder pressure for improvement (Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006; Weil, Fung, Graham,
and Fagotto, 2006; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Kaymak and Bektas, 2017). What, then, induces firm management to
disclose ESG information? Or, perhaps more pointedly, what inhibits them from disclosing more? The results of
Cohen, Malloy, and Nguyen (2016) suggest that one answer may be simple persistence on the part of firm
management. 
Cohen et al. (2016) examine textual changes in firm 10-K and 10-Q filings over the period 1994 to 2014 and find that
firm filings exhibit a significant degree of similarity between periods. The authors argue that, when faced with
repetitive tasks (e.g., the authorship of corporate regulatory filings), one approach taken by firm mangers in dealing
with the demands of the task is to “codify rules that lower the cost of performing these tasks.” Essentially, individuals 
act to reduce the burden of repetitive tasks by defaulting to their prior responses in dealing with the task. Although the 
primary focus of Cohen et al. (2016) is to examine instances where this codification is interrupted, the study provides
compelling evidence for the presence of disclosure inertia, or persistence, in corporate filings. For instance, one of the
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measures of overlap used by Cohen et al. (2016) with an interpretation similar to that of a correlation statistic, indicates
intertemporal disclosure overlap of 0.86, on average, over their entire twenty-one year sample period. If it is the case
that corporate filings suffer, at least to some degree, from codification or disclosure inertia, then one inhibitor to
increased ESG disclosure, given the lack of legal and/or regulatory mandates governing ESG disclosure for a majority 
of firms, may be as innocuous as persistence.1 
In the absence of regulatory ESG reporting requirements for a majority of U.S. firms, initiatives such as the Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative
and the Sustainable Accounting Standards Board continually work to increase corporate transparency in ESG disclosure by encouraging exchanges
and corporations to adopt disclosure policies that improve ESG disclosure transparency. 
Managers provide lower quality ESG disclosure simply based on their 
“recycling” of prior disclosures. Further, the effects of inertia would increase with time as both the potential and
propensity to codify are increased. In this paper, I examine explicitly the extent to which ESG disclosure is affected
by disclosure persistence on behalf of firm management. Specifically, I examine how the environmental, social, and
governance disclosure score (ESG Score) of a firm, as measured by Bloomberg Data Services (Bloomberg), is affected 
by managerial persistence, proxied by management time with the firm, or tenure. 
To examine the association, I obtain data on ESG disclosure from Bloomberg for firms over the period January 1st 
2006 through December 31st 2015. The ESG data is merged with data from S&P Capital IQ’s Compustat ExecuComp
database (Execucomp) in order to compute measures of management tenure (measures are constructed for both the
CEO as well as for firm management more generally). In univariate testing, I find a negative association between ESG 
disclosure and management tenure. Firms whose managers have been with their respective firms longer disclose less.
Further, I find that ESG disclosure scores by firms whose executives have increased tenure exhibit less intertemporal
variability. This effects holds whether the composition of firm management encompasses all managers tracked through
ExecuComp or is limited to just the CEO. The relation is persistent across the component measures of ESG disclosure
scores, i.e., environmental, social, and governance scores. Recognizing the potential for confounding factors, I 
examine the association in a multivariate framework. Controlling for the average age and compensation of firm
management, in addition to firm financial characteristics and industry and time fixed effects, I continue to find that
ESG disclosure is negatively related to managerial tenure. In economic terms, moving from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile of average manager tenure reduces the median ESG Score by 9.3% and reduces the intertemporal
variability in ESG disclosure by 20.1%. A similar percentile move in CEO tenure results in a drop of ESG Score by
4.5% and of ESG variability by 14.6%. 
To mitigate concerns relating to identification issues in the empirical methodology, I examine the association in an
event study framework where the relation between ESG disclosure and managerial tenure is examined subsequent to
the replacement of the firm’s CEO. The sample covers 714 instances of CEO turnover over the period. To conduct the
event study analysis, I propensity-score match the CEO turnover sample to a sample of firms for which the CEO was 
not replaced and examine the relation between CEO turnover and subsequent changes in ESG disclosure. The intuition
being that if persistence inhibits ESG disclosure, then a shock to the composition of management, specifically the
replacement of their chief executive, would interrupt persistence directly while affecting ESG strategies indirectly.
Firms that experience a CEO turnover exhibit positive and significant increases in ESG Score subsequent to the 
replacement of their CEO. Economically, the median composite ESG disclosure score increases nearly 9.7%, on 
average, in the two years subsequent to the replacement of a firm’s CEO. Interestingly, the overall change in ESG
Score seems to be driven by changes in environmental and governance disclosure strategies post-replacement and not
changes in social disclosure strategies. 
This study contributes to the literature on the adoption of corporate ESG disclosure strategies (Sharma, Pablo, and
Vredenburg, 1999; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Sharma, 2000; Rodriguez and Lemaster, 2007; Brammer and Pavelin, 
2008; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel, 2013; Gamerschlag, Moller, and Verbeeten, 2011; Huang,
2013; among others). The results show that persistence in management’s approach to ESG disclosure, as proxied by
managerial tenure, plays an important role in inhibiting more complete, transparent disclosures. Further, I document
that a shock to managerial tenure, by means of a CEO turnover, interrupts the inertia of ESG disclosure leading to an
increase in the information revealed by a firm. These findings are of direct interest to market participants and regulators
who are currently interested in improving ESG disclosures. In markets characterized by information asymmetries,
increasing ESG transparency leads to several documented improvements in firm efficiencies and financial
performance (Cho and Patten, 2007; Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Goss, 2009; Lee and Faff, 2009; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang,
and Yang, 2011; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Cheng, Ioannou, and 
Serafim, 2014; among others). 
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The findings of this study should not be interpreted hastily. It should not be inferred that a potential “solution” to
increasing the voluntary disclosure of ESG information is to increase managerial turnover. Instead, readers of this
study should recognize that: 1) codification of a repetitive task is a natural response to improve efficiencies in dealing
with these tasks; and, 2) that risk-averse market participants tend to react asymmetrically to release of new information.
It is therefore in the interest of management, at least in some cases, to withhold disclosure as the perceived costs to
disclosure exceed the perceived benefits (Teoh and Hwang, 1991; Genotte and Trueman, 1996). If markets desire
increased transparency along ESG dimensions from highly- persistent firms, then further study is needed in order to
construct incentive regimes, regulatory or otherwise, that induce more transparent, complete ESG disclosure while 
offering some leeway as more tenured managers update their firm’s current disclosure strategies. 
The results of this study are most closely related to those of Lewis, Walls, and Dowell (2014) who show that CEO
tenure is negatively related to the propensity of a firm to respond to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) survey. In
their study, Lewis et al. (2014) find that the likelihood of a firm to respond to the CDP survey decreases as CEO tenure
increases. Despite the apparent similarities, there are at least three key differences between this work and that of Lewis
et al. (2014). First, their work centers exclusively on environmental disclosure, whereas this study examines ESG 
disclosure more holistically by incorporating both an intertemporal examination of environmental disclosure as well
as an examination of social and governance disclosure in addition to environmental disclosure. This distinction is
important as ESG disclosure spans several facets of a firms overall, time-varying disclosure strategy outside of its
environmental strategies. Second, the dichotomous measure of disclosure used in Lewis et al. (2014) captures a
manager’s propensity to respond to the survey and not necessarily the quality of the disclosure itself nor the changes
in disclosure strategies over the firm’s lifecycle. The use of Bloomberg data enables both an examination of the quality
of the firm’s disclosure directly as well as the ability to quantify the economic impacts of changes in disclosure 
strategies through time. Finally, by using measures of ESG disclosure quality developed by an independent data
service for a large set of firms regardless of their preferences for inclusion, this study avoids the potential issues of 
inference using survey-based data thus enabling a broader extrapolation of its results (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).
For instance, inclusion into or omission from the CDP data may simply be a function of a firm maintaining an adequate 
investor relations staff, remembering to submit the survey in time, or as a function of the efficacy of the mailing
service in completing the round-trip. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and motivates
the study. Section 3 describes the data and sample identification procedures. Results of empirical analyses are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
Related Literature and Concept Development 
Strategies pertinent to disclosure rely on management’s interpretation of the costs and benefits of disclosure
(Verrecchia, 1983). ESG disclosure subjects management to a similar probabilistic assessment of the costs and benefits
of disclosure (Li, Richardson, and Thorton, 1997; Clarkson et al., 2008; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). In most instances,
managers are granted great leeway with respect to their ESG disclosure strategies (Clarkson et al., 2008). The
voluntary nature of most ESG disclosure provides space for managers to select the level of firm disclosure consistent
with their preferences (Sharma et al., 1999; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Sharma, 2000; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Doshi
et al., 2013). For example, managerial attitudes towards environmental issues affect firm strategies for pollution
reduction and play a prominent role in their firm’s response to environmental issues (Cordano and Frieze, 2000; Egri
and Herman, 2000; Sharma, 2000). Proponents for an expansion of ESG initiatives argue that increased ESG 
disclosure is the first step as disclosure transparency provides stakeholders the information necessary to induce
improvement (Greenstone et al., 2006; Weil et al., 2006; Doda et al., 2015). The question then becomes, what
inhibitors exist that hinder timely, thorough ESG disclosure? The findings of Cohen et al. (2016) suggest that one 
answer may be disclosure inertia arising through “default” choice behavior. 
Cohen et al. (2106) examine textual changes in corporate regulatory filings, i.e., 10-Q and 10-K filings, from one
period to the next. Although the authors are primarily interested in identifying instances of textual change, they
document significant “inertia” in corporate disclosure. The authors argue that corporate disclosure suffers from the
“default” choice problems identified in psychology and behavioral economics literature. Cohen et al. (2016) suggest
that, “Defaults generally take effect when an agent fails to make an active choice, fails to update his selection, or fails 
to ‘opt out’ of a given baseline selection.” Decision inertia, or default choice behavior, has been leveraged in numerous 
settings ranging from 401k planning choices (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2004, 
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Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009), to long-distance carrier selection (Schweitzer, 1994), to organ donation
settings (Davidai, Gilovitch, and Ross, 2012) in efforts by social planners to encourage “more” desirable social 
outcomes. The basic premise of decision inertia argues that, when faced with repetitive tasks, one approach taken by
individuals in dealing with the demands of the task is to “codify rules that lower the cost of performing these tasks.”
The findings of Cohen et al. (2016) seem to suggest that this phenomenon is present in corporate regulatory filings. 
As a result, decision inertia, or simple persistence, may affect the quality of ESG disclosure as managers seek to codify
their approach in dealing with the repetitive task. Managers provide lower quality ESG disclosure simply based on
their “recycling” of prior disclosures. 
Existing literature on the effects of executive tenure on organizational change offer insights into the association 
between ESG disclosure quality and the phenomenon of disclosure persistence. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990)
show that executive team tenure is a significant determinant of firm strategy and performance with long-tenured teams
exhibiting more static strategies. Miller and Shamsie (2001) document a decline in product line experimentation with
increased executive tenure. The documented stagnation of executive’s strategies over time executive has been
attributed to a commitment to the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993) as executives become
more wedded to the correctness of their views (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Miller (1991) suggests that managers
are prone to become risk- averse and insulated from new approaches as tenure increases. Finkelstein and D’Aveni 
(1994) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) argue that the propensity towards static strategies is somewhat institutionalized
as a manager’s informal power becomes institutionalized. For example, long- tenured managers are able to increase
their influence by promoting demographically similar subordinates (Westphal and Zajac, 1995) thus increasing their
commitment to established strategies (Miller, 1991). As it relates to disclosure, Cohen et al. (2016) document a
reduction in similarity measures from one period to the next for corporate regulatory disclosures when the CEO or 
CFO are replaced. The change in CEO/CFO seems to serve as a mechanism to induce changes in disclosure strategies.
Most closely related to this work is that Lewis et al. (2014) who find that CEO tenure is negatively related to the 
propensity of a firm to respond to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) survey. The authors conclude that newer CEOs
are more likely to acquiesce to institutional pressures to disclose. 
The contribution of this study is to advance our understanding of inhibitors to quality ESG disclosure. Given the extant
literature on disclosure strategies, managerial preferences, and persistence, I hypothesize that persistence plays a role 
in ESG disclosure strategies. I test this hypothesis in three ways. First, I examine how the completeness of ESG
disclosure is affected by managerial tenure. Given the trend of increasing institutional pressures for higher quality 
ESG disclosure, I would expect that tenure is negatively related to ESG disclosure completeness. Second, I explore
how ESG disclosure varies within a given firm over time as a function of managerial tenure. If tenure negatively
affects ESG disclosure quality and engenders disclosure persistence, then I would expect to find that variability is 
reduced as tenure increases. Finally, I investigate the association following the replacement of a firm’s CEO. If 
persistence negatively affects ESG disclosure quality, then a shock to the composition of firm management should
mitigate the effect. 
Research Approach, Data and Methodology 
ESG disclosure score data are gathered from Bloomberg over the period January 1st, 2006 through December 31st,
2015. The Bloomberg data are limited to those firms who are tracked by Compustat in order to collect measures of 
firm financial characteristics. The ESG data offered by Bloomberg contain a composite, firm-year measure of ESG
disclosure score (ESG Score) as well as individual disclosure scores for the component parts of ESG [i.e., 
environmental disclosure score (Environ), social disclosure score (Social), and governance disclosure score (Govnce)]
where available. Bloomberg offers the following description of their ESG measure: “Proprietary Bloomberg score
based on the extent of a company’s Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure. …The score is also
tailored to different industry sectors.” Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure scores capture the disclosure activity of a given
firm adjusted for the disclosure activity of firms operating within the same industry. ESG disclosure scores range from
0.1 for firms who disclose a “minimum amount of ESG data” to 100 for “those that disclose every data point collected
by Bloomberg.”2 
2 Bloomberg records a score of “N/A” for firms whose disclosure does not contain any data relating to data points used in the construction of
ESG Score. 
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Data on manager tenure is collected from ExecuComp. The ExecuComp data includes information on the
compensation structure and demographic characteristics of the top-five executive officers within a firm. For each firm-
individual combination, I construct a measure of the individual’s tenure by counting the number of consecutive years
the individual has been with the firm. For each firm, I then take the average tenure to construct a measure of the
average tenure of the top-five executives (Avg Tenure). In addition to Avg Tenure, I construct a measure of the CEO’s
tenure in the Chief Executive Officer position (CEO Tenure). This measure counts the number of consecutive years
the CEO has been in the chief executive position with the firm. In addition to the measures of tenure collected from
ExecuComp, I collect data on the average age of management (Avg Age), the age of the CEO (CEO Age), the CEO’s
total compensation for a given year (CEO Comp), and on the gender of the CEO (CEO Gender). 
Finally, I collect measures of firm financial characteristics from Compustat. Consistent with the approaches of prior
studies which examine ESG disclosure (e.g., Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Huang, 2013), I construct measures of firm
size (Revenue), firm age (Firm Age), growth opportunities (Market-to-Book), capital expenditures (CapEx), leverage
(Leverage), profitability (ROS), and of the firm’s asset tangibility (Tangible Assets).3 
3 A detailed description of variable calculations is provided in Appendix A. 
The sample identification
process results in a final sample of 10,096 firm-year observations covering 1,450 firms over the period January 1st,
2006 through December 31st, 2015. Descriptive statistics on the sample are provided in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel A reports the descriptive results for the entire sample. The mean (median) ESG Score is19.001 (14.050) across
the firm-year observations in the sample. The mean (median) within-firm standard deviation of ESG Score, i.e., ࢽ(ESG 
Score), is 3.044 (1.477). Data on the individual component disclosure scores is limited for the sample consistent with
the universe of Bloomberg ESG data. Of the 10,096 observations on ESG Score, Bloomberg provides component
scores for 3,749, 6,580, and 10,090 firm-year observations for Eviron, Social, and Govnce, respectively. The mean 
CEO tenure is 6.188 over the sample; Avg Tenure is slightly less at 5.081 years. Panels B and C provide descriptive
statistics on the ESG disclosure scores and tenure by fiscal- year and Fama-French (1997) 17-industry classification,
respectively. ESG disclosure scores remain relatively constant throughout the sample period with the exception of the
first year of the sample. The cross-industry scores and score variability exhibit greater variability. ESG Score and ࢽ 
(ESG Score) are lowest in the Steel Industry at 14.591 and 1.599, respectively, and are highest in the Utility Industry
at 28.013 and 5.784. It should noted that cross-industry comparison of univariate ESG disclosure levels offers little 
insight as ESG disclosure scores are industry adjusted. 
Analysis of Empirical Results 
ESG Disclosure and Tenure: Univariate Results 
Table 2 presents a pairwise correlation matrix of the measures used in the analysis. Pearson (Spearman) correlations
are presented below (above) the diagonal. ESG disclosure scores and ESG disclosure variability are inversely
correlated with Avg Tenure for all measures of disclosure over the sample period. For both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations, this relation is statistically significant at conventional levels for 9 of the 10 correlations. CEO Tenure is
negatively, and statistically significantly, related to ESG disclosure scores and variability for 6 of the 10 ESG measures
(the remaining 4 correlations are statistically indistinguishable from zero). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Management tenure is negatively related to ESG disclosure levels and disclosure variability on average consistent
with the existence of persistence in disclosure strategy. For the remaining CEO and manager characteristics, ESG
disclosure scores are positively correlated with the age of managers and CEOs and with the level of CEO 
compensation. 
5 
  
   
    
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
    
     
  
   
    
     
    
  
   
 
    
  
 
   
   
    
 
   
  
  
  
    
  
 
  
 
   
  
  
  
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, published by Wiley. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1002/csr.1521 
ESG Disclosure and Tenure: Multivariate Results 
Structural characteristics of Bloomberg’s approach to ESG disclosure scoring, namely the industry adjustment, along
with the variability in manager and firm characteristics presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest significant variation within
the sample. To account for the heterogeneity within the sample, I conduct a set of cross-sectional, time-series
regressions on the relation between ESG disclosure scores and management tenure. Following prior literature on
voluntary ESG disclosure, I include measures of firm size (Revenue), firm age (Firm Age), growth opportunities
(Market-to-Book), capital expenditures (CapEx), leverage (Leverage), profitability (ROS), and of the firm’s asset 
tangibility (Tangible Assets) (Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Huang, 2013). To control for cross-correlations in disclosure 
scores, the regression specifications include fixed effects for fiscal-year and Fama-French (1997) 17-industry and 
compute robust standard errors clustered by fiscal-year. The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table
3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The dependent variable in the first set of regression tests, those presented in the left-hand side of Table 3, is the firm’s
composite ESG disclosure score (ESG Score). Overall, the results indicate a negative relation between ESG disclosure
and managerial tenure. The results in the left-most column of Table 3 examine the association using the CEO’s tenure 
(CEO Tenure) in addition to the covariates describes above. CEO tenure is negatively related to ESG disclosure
controlling for other factors. In economic terms, moving from the 25th percentile of CEO Tenure to the 75th reduces
the median ESG Score by 4.5%. The second column of Table 3 examines the relation between Avg Tenure and ESG 
Score. The coefficient estimate on Avg Tenure is negative, statistically significant, and nearly three times that of CEO 
Tenure. A move from the 25th percentile of Avg Tenure to the 75th percentile is associated with a reduction in ESG 
Score of 9.3%. The third column of Table 3 presents the results of the fully-specified model where CEO Tenure and
Avg Tenure are simultaneously included as covariates. Tenure is negatively related to ESG disclosure scores for both
measures of tenure. The coefficient estimate on Avg Tenure, however, is nearly ten times that of CEO Tenure. From
an economic perspective, the negative effect on ESG disclosure of a move from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile
for Avg Tenure is roughly 8.8% while that on CEO Tenure is markedly less at negative 1.1%. 
The right-hand side of table 3 presents the results of an examination of the association between manager tenure and
the variability of ESG scores. The dependent variable in these tests is the standard deviation of ESG Score by firm, 
i.e., ࢽ (ESG Score). CEO Tenure and Avg Tenure are negatively related to the variability of ESG disclosure scores for 
all three specifications. In the fully specified model, a move from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile for Avg 
Tenure (CEO Tenure) is associated with a reduction of disclosure variability of roughly 16.5% (8.8%). ESG disclosure 
by firms with increased managerial tenure exhibit less variability over the sample period consistent with the notion
that ESG disclosure strategies exhibit intertemporal persistence. 
The composite measure of ESG disclosure, ESG Score, provides an aggregate measure of ESG disclosure. To ensure 
that the results are not driven by any single component of the composite ESG disclosure score, I conduct a series of
regression tests using the component scores. The number of observations varies across this series of tests as a result
of data availability limitations on the Bloomberg system for component scores, i.e., of the 10,096 firm-year
observations in the sample, Bloomberg provides data on Environ, Social, and Govnce for 3,749, 6,580, and 10,090
firm-year observations, respectively. I repeat a version of the regression analyses presented in Table 3 for ESG Score, 
its component measures, and of ESG disclosure score variability. As with the prior regression specifications, all tests 
include fixed effects for fiscal-year and Fama-French (1997) 17-industry and compute robust standard errors clustered 
by fiscal-year. The results of these tests are presented in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Panel A of Table 4 displays the results of analyses using the level of disclosure as the dependent variable. The left-
third of Panel A displays the results of analyses of the association between CEO Tenure and ESG component
disclosure scores. The first column simply repeats the results of Table 3 for comparison purposes. The remaining three
columns present the results for testing on Environ, Social, and Govnce, respectively. The coefficient estimates are
negative for all specifications and are statistically significant for the component specifications using Environ and 
Govnce as their dependent variables. The middle third of Panel A reports the results on the association using Avg 
Tenure as its proxy for persistence. Across all specifications, Avg Tenure is negatively related to ESG disclosure and
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ESG component disclosures. The right-most third reports the results of a fully specified model where CEO Tenure
and Avg Tenure are included as covariates. The relation between ESG disclosure and tenure is negative and statistically
significant for all of the coefficient estimates on Avg Tenure. In the fully specified model, the variation in Avg Tenure
subsumes the some of the effect of CEO Tenure. This result is somewhat expected given the high correlation between 
the two measures. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of tests examining the variability of ESG component disclosure scores. 
Coefficient estimates on CEO Tenure and Avg Tenure are negative across all model specifications. Further, the
association is statistically significant for all estimates on Avg Tenure and is significant for CEO Tenure for all but one 
specification. The negative coefficient estimates suggest that increases in tenure, either for the CEO or for the average
of the top managers, is associated with a reduction in intertemporal ESG disclosure variability. Taken with the results
in Panel A, increases in managerial tenure are associated with reductions in ESG disclosure and increases in disclosure
persistence across the component measures of ESG and are not driven by any single ESG component. 
ESG Disclosure and Tenure: Event Study Analysis 
In this section I explore the association between ESG disclosure and managerial tenure in an event study framework.
To accomplish this, I examine how the association changes following a shock to composition of management, 
specifically, a CEO turnover event. CEO turnover events are an ideal setting to examine the effects of persistence on
ESG disclosure as the composition of management, specifically the chief executive, is changed thus directly affecting
decision inertia, i.e., persistence, while only indirectly affecting ESG disclosure. Using ExecuComp to identify
instances where the CEO for a given firm is replaced, I identify 714 CEO turnover events for the sample firms over 
the period. To control for contemporaneous changes in industry or market characteristics contributing to the turnover 
event, I follow the methodology of Weisbach (1988) to construct a propensity-score matched sample where firms who 
experience a turnover in a given year are matched to firms which did not experience a turnover. The matching process
yields a balanced sample of 1,428 observations, half of which experienced a turnover. 
To examine the effect of the turnover on ESG disclosure, I construct three change measures of ESG disclosure scores.
For each measure of ESG disclosure, including the composite score and its component scores, I compute the difference 
in the score from the fiscal-year end before the turnover year to the fiscal-year end of the turnover year [(t-ĺW@ 
from the fiscal-year end before the turnover year to the fiscal-year end after the turnover year [(t-ĺW@DQGIURP  
the fiscal-year end before the turnover year to the fiscal-year end two years after the turnover year [(t-ĺW@7 KH 
two-year period subsequent to the turnover event is examined due to the fact that Gabarro (1987) finds that nearly all 
major actions taken by new CEOs occur in this interval. The changes in ESG disclosure scores are then used a 
dependent variables in change regression specifications. The change specifications use, as covariates, the 
contemporaneous change in the independent variables described in previous testing. In addition to the changes in
control variables, a new indicator variable, CEO Turnover, is added which takes a value of 1 of the observation is for
a sample firm who experienced a CEO turnover, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the prior regression specifications, 
all specifications include fixed effects for fiscal-year and Fama-French (1997) 17-industry and compute robust
standard errors clustered by fiscal-year. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 presents the results of the event study tests examining the changes in ESG disclosure subsequent to the
replacement of a firm’s CEO. In summary, CEO turnovers are accompanied with future improvements in ESG 
disclosure consistent with the notion that a shock to the persistence in disclosure strategies improves ESG disclosure.
The replacement of a firm’s CEO is associated with an improvement in median ESG Score of 9.7%, on average, over
the two years subsequent to the turnover event. Changes in Environ and Govnce exhibit a similar pattern, i.e., both
measures display improvement in disclosure over the two years subsequent to the replacement of a firm’s CEO.
Interestingly, the results for the specifications using Social as their dependent variables exhibit a positive association
between social disclosure and CEO turnover, but the association is statistically insignificant (the p-value on the CEO
Turnover coefficient estimate in the two-year post-turnover specification is just outside of conventional significance
levels at 0.165). Collectively, the results seem to suggest an improvement in ESG disclosure when disclosure 
persistence suffers an interrupting event. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
Research on the determinants of voluntary ESG disclosure seeks to understand the heterogeneity in corporate 
disclosure strategies. In this study, I suggest that one factor affecting ESG disclosure quality and completeness is
persistence on behalf of firm managers in their disclosure strategies. Managers provide lower-quality, less-informative
ESG disclosure simply based on their “recycling” of prior disclosures. Further, the effects of persistence increase in 
managerial tenure as both the propensity and the possibility to codify are increased. 
Using Bloomberg data on ESG disclosure scores, I find a significant negative association between manager tenure
and ESG disclosure transparency and ESG disclosure variability. Firms whose managers have been with their
respective firms longer disclose less and provide disclosures that exhibit reduced intertemporal variability. I validate
this relation between ESG disclosure strategy and tenure in at least three ways. First, I show that the association is
economically significant. A move from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in the average tenure of firm
management is associated with a reduction in the median ESG disclosure score and the median disclosure variability
of 9.3% and 20.1%, respectively. A similar percentile move in CEO tenure results in a drop of ESG Score by 4.5%
and of disclosure variability by 14.6%. Secondly, I document evidence for the relation across the components measures
of ESG disclosure score. And, finally, I document an interruption in disclosure persistence following a CEO turnover
event. The median composite ESG disclosure score improves 9.7%, on average, in the two years following the 
replacement of a firm’s chief executive. 
This study contributes to recent literature that seeks to understand the adoption and implementation of corporate ESG
disclosure strategies (Sharma et al., 1999; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Sharma, 2000; Rodriguez and Lemaster, 2007;
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Doshi et al., 2013; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Huang, 2013;
among others). The findings in Lewis et al. (2014) suggest that manager characteristics affect a firm’s likelihood to
“acquiesce to institutional pressures” to initially disclosure environmental information. The results of this work show
that disclosure persistence, or inertia, plays an important role in inhibiting more complete, transparent ESG disclosures
across the various facets of ESG disclosure and throughout the firm’s lifecycle. These findings are of direct interest
to market participants and regulators who are currently interested in improving ESG disclosure. 
Further study is needed in order to determine incentive regimes, regulatory or otherwise, that induce more transparent, 
complete ESG disclosure. Codification of a task, a contributing mechanism to disclosure persistence, is a natural
response to improve efficiencies in dealing with repetitive tasks. The findings of this study suggest that disclosure
persistence arising through codification of ESG disclosure inhibits more complete, transparent ESG disclosure. 
Further, in markets characterized by risk-averse participants, it is in the interest of management to withhold disclosure
in some cases as the perceived costs to disclosure exceed the perceived benefits. If markets desire increased
transparency in ESG disclosure from highly-persistent firms, then incentives needed to be constructed in such a way 
that they allow some concessions as managers work to update their current ESG disclosure strategies. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample 
N Mean Median Std. Dev. p5 p25 p75 p95 
ESG Disclosure Scores 
ESG Score 10,096 19.001 14.050 11.744 11.157 11.157 20.661 46.694 
 ESG Score) 10,096 3.044 1.477 3.757 0.000 0.364 4.563 11.130) ࢽ
Environ Score 3,749 20.591 15.504 17.210 1.550 6.202 33.103 53.488 
Social Score 6,580 18.128 14.035 14.822 3.509 8.772 24.561 49.123 
Govnce Score 10,090 51.899 51.786 5.926 46.429 48.214 51.786 62.500 
Management Characteristics
CEO Tenure 10,096 6.188 5.000 4.394 1.000 3.000 8.000 15.000 
CEO Age 10,096 56.074 56.000 7.145 45.000 51.000 60.000 68.000 
CEO Comp ($M) 10,096 6.021 4.424 5.489 0.751 2.193 7.929 17.400 
CEO Gender 10,096 0.966 1.000 0.182 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Avg Tenure 10,096 5.081 4.600 2.683 1.750 3.000 6.500 10.000 
Avg Age 10,096 53.023 53.167 3.954 46.571 50.429 55.500 59.333 
Firm Characteristics
Revenue ($B) 10,096 6.326 1.960 11.288 0.176 0.690 5.967 33.887 
Firm Age 10,096 30.075 24.000 18.107 6.000 16.000 46.000 63.000 
Market-to-Book 10,096 1.852 1.400 1.527 0.433 0.865 2.318 4.912 
CapEx 10,096 0.081 0.036 0.145 0.007 0.020 0.071 0.300 
Leverage 10,096 0.227 0.213 0.189 0.000 0.064 0.337 0.568 
ROS 10,096 0.097 0.110 0.361 -0.030 0.058 0.171 0.309 
Tangible Assets 10,096 0.273 0.196 0.230 0.026 0.090 0.394 0.761 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the sample of firm-year observations covered in the period January 1st,
2006 through December 31st, 2016. The sample covers all firms with ESG data available from Bloomberg who are
also covered by ExecuComp and Compustat. ESG Score and its component scores are obtained directly from
Bloomberg. Tenure variables are computed based on the number of consecutive years a given executive is associated 
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with the same firm in ExecuComp. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample. Panels B and C present
statistics on ESG scores and tenure measures by fiscal-year end and Fama and French (1997) 17- industry
classifications, respectively. Remaining variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Panel B: Means by Year CEO 
Tenure 
Avg 
Tenure Year N ESG Score V(ESG Score) Environ Social Govnce 
2006 159 23.738 6.249 19.570 18.146 53.673 6.019 5.325
2007 650 18.552 4.142 19.066 13.971 51.769 5.194 4.755
2008 847 18.315 3.807 18.416 13.698 51.443 5.478 4.806
2009 938  3.540 20.082 15.593 51.839 5.767 4.854
2010 1,268 18.063
19.174
2.796 20.533 16.914 51.777 5.900 4.908
2011 1,303 18.393 2.693 21.386 18.258 51.805 6.234 5.071
2012 1,311 19.035 2.628 21.269 19.152 51.855 6.352 5.195
2013 1,267 19.699 2.697 22.084 20.657 52.182 6.552 5.295
2014 1,268 19.825 2.725 21.117 21.223 52.160 6.686 5.263
2015 1,085 18.971 2.881 20.004 21.825 51.794 6.806 5.266
Panel C: Means by Industry CEO 
Tenure 
Avg 
Tenure Industry N ESG Score V(ESG Score) Environ Social Govnce 
Food 372 23.092 4.257 21.427 24.937 53.610 5.946 5.738
Mining 146 23.361 4.327 21.552 25.379 55.186 6.445 5.030
Oil 491 21.995 3.801 17.592 20.593 53.208 6.263 5.251
Clths 194 17.422 2.109 17.975 16.578 50.709 6.572 4.912
Durbl 174 16.432 3.051 19.158 14.069 50.718 5.931 4.904
Chem 318 23.115 5.404 25.473 24.424 53.768 5.978 5.364
Cnsum 449 23.396 3.912 34.465 21.933 53.527 5.381 4.337
Cnstr 471 17.671 2.399 16.354 16.567 51.649 6.565 5.891
Steel 126 14.591 1.599 8.958 12.982 50.865 7.302 5.361 
Fabpr 121 15.952 1.662 17.079 14.787 51.018 6.893 4.900
Machn 1,612 18.986 3.011 20.576 17.379 51.911 6.447 4.992
Cars 234 17.905 2.956 18.587 13.624 51.725 5.645 4.699
Trans 559 19.930 3.372 22.013 18.968 52.060 6.449 5.350
Utils 516 28.013 5.784 19.610 25.574 56.582 5.535 5.525 
Rtail 867 18.239 2.436 19.724 15.543 50.820 6.478 5.211 
Other 3,446 16.438 2.372 19.729 15.201 50.783 6.091 4.888
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) Diagonal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) ESG Score 1.000 0.569 c 0.968 c 0.851 c 0.725 c -0.020 0.049 c 0.403 c -0.051 c -0.092 c 0.089 c 
(2) V(ESG Score) 0.677 c 1.000 0.561 c 0.465 c 0.427 c -0.068 c -0.017 0.232 c -0.019 -0.069 c 0.004 
(3) Environ Score 0.971 c 0.493 c 1.000 0.721 c 0.641 c -0.039 b 0.042 b 0.379 c -0.051 c -0.097 c 0.061 c 
(4) Social Score 0.895 c 0.522 c 0.729 c 1.000 0.619 c 0.024 0.040 b 0.346 c -0.028 a -0.057 c 0.118 c 
(5) Govnce Score 0.785 c 0.535 c 0.636 c 0.654 c 1.000 -0.034 b 0.074 c 0.312 c -0.051 c -0.065 c 0.131 c 
(6) CEO Tenure 0.002 -0.030 c -0.034 b 0.007 -0.002 1.000 0.388 c 0.086 c 0.104 c 0.366 c 0.142 c 
(7) CEO Age 0.049 c 0.019 a 0.039 b 0.040 c 0.043 c 0.401 c 1.000 0.077 c 0.070 c 0.188 c 0.507 c 
(8) CEO Comp 0.457 c 0.374 c 0.309 c 0.337 c 0.389 c 0.063 c 0.055 c 1.000 -0.082 c -0.068 c 0.111 c 
(9) CEO Gender -0.038 c 0.001 -0.054 c -0.026 b -0.038 c 0.061 c 0.046 c -0.045 c 1.000 0.097 c -0.037 b 
(10) Avg Tenure -0.018 a -0.019 a -0.114 c -0.026 b -0.005 0.457 c 0.245 c 0.002 0.028 c 1.000 0.306 c 
(11) Avg Age 0.106 c 0.070 c 0.058 c 0.132 c 0.092 c 0.221 c 0.558 c 0.090 c -0.003 0.381 c 1.000 
This table presents a correlation matrix of the ESG scores and manager characteristic variables used in the analysis. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are 
presented below (above) the diagonal. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Statistical tests on relation between variables are performed for 
both measurements of correlation. Results are presented to the right of each correlation statistic where a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3: ESG Disclosure and Management Tenure 
Dependent Variable = ESG Score V(ESG Score) 
CEO Tenure -0.127 c -0.036 b -0.043 c -0.026 c 
(-11.985) (-2.208) (-7.818) (-4.621) 
Avg Tenure -0.375 c -0.352 c -0.085 c -0.069 c 
(-13.667) (-10.006) (-13.248) (-10.218) 
CEO Age 0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.000 
(0.092) (0.072) (0.667) (-0.541) (-1.483) (-0.062) 
CEO Comp 0.284 c 0.270 c 0.272 c 0.048 c 0.044 c 0.046 c 
(7.899) (7.866) (7.916) (4.977) (4.694) (4.807) 
CEO Gender -0.288 a -0.297 b -0.264 a 0.413 c 0.394 c 0.417 c 
(-1.735) (-2.196) (-1.836) (6.244) (6.208) (6.442) 
Ln(Revenue) 3.924 c 3.946 c 3.945 c 1.204 c 1.209 c 1.209 c 
(45.897) (46.239) (46.725) (26.303) (26.339) (26.107) 
Firm Age 0.076 c 0.083 c 0.083 c 0.012 c 0.013 c 0.013 c 
(20.969) (23.506) (23.506) (6.054) (6.850) (6.833) 
Mkt-to-Bk 0.730 c 0.728 c 0.733 c 0.199 c 0.197 c 0.200 c 
(18.180) (17.636) (17.788) (8.586) (8.556) (8.643) 
CapEx 4.318 c 4.253 c 4.265 c 2.566 c 2.546 c 2.555 c 
(6.388) (5.989) (6.057) (15.217) (15.068) (15.394) 
Leverage -4.849 c -5.125 c -5.142 c -0.850 c -0.895 c -0.907 c 
(-12.255) (-12.613) (-12.749) (-12.514) (-13.543) (-13.705) 
Tangible 4.329 c 4.552 c 4.554 c 0.817 c 0.860 c 0.861 c 
(19.151) (19.232) (19.545) (7.772) (7.691) (8.036) 
ROS -2.008 c -2.001 c -1.999 c -0.533 c -0.532 c -0.531 c 
(-13.996) (-14.933) (-14.884) (-13.684) (-14.554) (-14.248) 
Constant -16.632 c -15.768 c -16.070 c -7.780 c -7.456 c -7.669 c 
(-15.430) (-15.089) (-15.583) (-35.707) (-34.081) (-33.798) 
Observations 10,096 10,096 10,096 10,096 10,096 10,096 
Adj. R2 0.449 0.453 0.453 0.363 0.364 0.365 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary-least-squares regression estimation on the relation between 
ESG Score, ESG score variability, manager tenure, and a vector of control variables. ESG Score is the composite 
disclosure score as reported by Bloomberg. ESG score variability, i.e., (ESG Score), is the standard deviation of 
ESG Score for a given firm. Measures of tenure are computed from ExecuComp as the number of consecutive 
years an individual exists in the data set with a given firm. All specifications include fixed effects for fiscal-year 
and industry using Fama and French (1997) 17-industry classifications and compute robust standard errors 
clustered by fiscal-year. t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Remaining 
variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 4: ESG Disclosure Components and Manager Tenure 
Panel A: Disclosure Level 
ESG Environ Social Govnce ESG Environ Social Govnce ESG Environ Social Govnce 
CEO Tenure 
Avg Tenure 
CEO Age 
CEO Comp 
CEO Gender 
Ln(Revenue) 
Firm Age 
Mkt-to-Bk 
CapEx 
Leverage 
Tangible 
ROS 
Constant 
-0.127 
(-11.985) 
0.001 
(0.092) 
0.284 
(7.899) 
-0.288 
(-1.735) 
3.924 
(45.897) 
0.076 
(20.969) 
0.730 
(18.180) 
4.318 
(6.388) 
-4.849 
(-12.255) 
4.329 
(19.151) 
-2.008 
(-13.996) 
-16.632 
(-15.430) 
c 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.140 b 
c 
c 
c 
b 
b 
c 
c 
c 
  
 
(-2.119) 
0.074 
(1.505) 
0.159 
(3.103) 
0.460 
(0.317) 
6.017 
(23.647)  
0.051 
(3.304) 
0.471 
(2.319) 
-0.371 
(-0.167) 
-3.976 
(-2.264) 
6.064 
(3.521) 
12.067 
(3.983) 
-43.863 
(-12.348) 
-0.048 
(-1.263) 
-0.037 
(-1.552) 
0.203 
(6.036) 
1.955 
(2.520) 
4.435 
(29.353)  
0.099 
(9.836) 
0.443 
(4.326) 
1.559 
(0.939) 
-3.592 
(-4.219) 
5.781 
(5.685) 
-1.028 
(-1.132) 
-22.429 
(-12.474) 
 
 
c 
b 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
  
-0.061 
(-5.179) 
0.004 
(0.524) 
0.127 
(9.651) 
-0.454 
(-1.881) 
1.610 
(32.192) 
0.042 
(11.996) 
0.382 
(11.542) 
1.754 
(3.740) 
-1.726 
(-5.687) 
1.655 
(5.132) 
-0.629 
(-6.867) 
36.733 
(68.266) 
c 
  
 
 
c 
 
a 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
-0.375 c 
c 
b 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
(-13.667) 
0.001 
(0.072) 
0.270 
(7.866) 
-0.297 
(-2.196) 
3.946 
(46.239) 
0.083 
(23.506) 
0.728 
(17.636) 
4.253 
(5.989) 
-5.125 
(-12.613) 
4.552 
(19.232) 
-2.001 
(-14.933) 
-15.768 
(-15.089) 
-0.583 
(-6.279) 
0.075 
(1.730) 
0.137 
(2.684) 
0.843 
(0.572) 
5.988 
(23.761)  
0.057 
(3.745) 
0.497 
(2.469) 
0.052 
(0.023) 
-4.453 
(-2.547) 
6.521 
(3.857) 
12.686 
(4.238) 
-42.372 
(-12.261) 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
b 
b 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.385 
(-6.886) 
-0.021 
(-0.967) 
0.193 
(5.759) 
2.065 
(2.671) 
4.440 
(29.613)  
0.104 
(10.419)  
0.471 
(4.637) 
1.648 
(0.990) 
-3.838 
(-4.488) 
6.092 
(6.047) 
-0.746 
(-0.785) 
-22.105 
(-12.743) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.145 
(-8.054)  
0.001 
(0.088) 
0.121 
(9.297) 
-0.472 
(-1.956)  
1.618 
(32.575)  
0.044 
(12.528)  
0.380 
(11.531)  
1.725 
(3.673) 
-1.817 
(-5.968)  
1.734 
(5.387) 
-0.628 
(-6.861)  
37.175 
(71.100) 
c 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.036 
(-2.208) 
-0.352 
(-10.006) 
0.008 
(0.667) 
0.272 
(7.916) 
-0.264 
(-1.836) 
3.945 
(46.725) 
0.083 
(23.506) 
0.733 
(17.788) 
4.265 
(6.057) 
-5.142 
(-12.749) 
4.554 
(19.545) 
-1.999 
(-14.884) 
-16.070 
(-15.583) 
b 
c 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.012 
(-0.171) 
-0.576 
(-5.977) 
0.078 
(1.606) 
0.138 
(2.690) 
0.853 
(0.580) 
5.986 
(23.650)  
0.057 
(3.742) 
0.499 
(2.468) 
0.059 
(0.027) 
-4.452 
(-2.547) 
6.501 
(3.829) 
12.664 
(4.223) 
-42.495 
(-12.016) 
 
c 
c 
c 
c 
b 
b 
c 
c 
c 
  
0.053 
(1.283) 
-0.418 
(-6.996) 
-0.033 
(-1.357) 
0.191 
(5.683) 
2.028 
(2.624) 
4.441 
(29.638)  
0.104 
(10.441)  
0.461 
(4.498) 
1.616 
(0.970) 
-3.815 
(-4.464) 
6.140 
(6.086) 
-0.687 
(-0.719) 
-21.598 
(-12.088) 
 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.029 
(-2.200)  
-0.127 
(-6.391)  
0.006 
(0.881) 
0.122 
(9.376) 
-0.446 
(-1.846)  
1.618 
(32.539)  
0.044 
(12.532)  
0.383 
(11.585)  
1.735 
(3.693) 
-1.831 
(-6.013)  
1.735 
(5.391) 
-0.627 
(-6.828)  
36.936 
(68.801) 
b 
c 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
Observations 
Adj. R2 
10,096 
0.449 
3,749 
0.271 
6,580 
0.359 
10,090 
0.342 
10,096 
0.453 
3,749 
0.276 
6,580 
0.363 
10,090 
0.344 
10,096 
0.453 
3,749 
0.276 
6,580 
0.364 
10,090 
0.344 
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Table 4 presents the results of ordinary-least-squares regression estimation on the association between ESG Score and its components, ESG score variability, 
manager tenure, and a vector of control variables. ESG Score and its components scores are obtained from Bloomberg. The variability of ESG disclosure scores 
are computed by firm. Measures of tenure are computed from ExecuComp as the number of consecutive years an individual exists in the data set with a given 
firm. Panel A presents the results of tests using the level of ESG disclosure as it dependent variables. Panel B presents the results of tests using the variability in 
ESG disclosure scores. All specifications include fixed effects for fiscal-year and industry using Fama and French (1997) 17-industry classifications and 
compute robust standard errors clustered by fiscal-year. t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Remaining variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix A. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4: ESG Disclosure Components and Manager Tenure (Cont.) 
Panel B :Disclosure Variability 
(ESG) (Environ) (Social) (Govnce) (ESG) (Environ) (Social) (Govnce) (ESG) (Environ) (Social) (Govnce) 
CEO Tenure 
Avg Tenure 
CEO Age 
CEO Comp 
CEO Gender 
Ln(Revenue) 
Firm Age 
Mkt-to-Bk 
CapEx 
Leverage 
Tangible 
ROS 
Constant 
-0.043 
(-7.818) 
-0.002 
(-0.541) 
0.048 
(4.977) 
0.413 
(6.244) 
1.204 
(26.303) 
0.012 
(6.054) 
0.199 
(8.586) 
2.566 
(15.217) 
-0.850 
(-12.514) 
0.817 
(7.772) 
-0.533 
(-13.684) 
-7.780 
(-35.707) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.058 
(-3.190) 
-0.003 
(-0.233) 
0.007 
(0.453) 
0.689 
(1.887) 
1.759 
(25.257) 
-0.004 
(-0.879) 
0.238 
(3.552) 
1.062 
(1.253) 
-0.580 
(-1.187) 
2.288 
(4.430) 
2.508 
(2.921) 
-10.482 
(-10.887) 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.039 
(-3.100) 
-0.025 
(-3.008) 
0.036 
(3.227) 
0.823 
(4.067) 
1.402 
(29.775)  
0.019 
(5.620) 
0.070 
(1.958) 
2.940 
(4.361) 
0.114 
(0.344) 
0.949 
(2.752) 
0.377 
(1.183) 
-6.630 
(-11.937) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
 
-0.036 
(-5.845) 
-0.000 
(-0.010) 
0.026 
(4.660) 
0.197 
(1.204) 
0.480 
(19.588) 
0.013 
(8.036) 
0.006 
(0.361) 
1.168 
(3.902) 
-0.019 
(-0.118) 
0.697 
(3.881) 
-0.222 
(-4.360) 
-2.263 
(-7.152) 
c 
 
 
 
c 
 
 
 
c 
 
c 
 
 
 
c 
 
 
 
c 
 
c 
 
c 
 
-0.085 
(-13.248) 
-0.005 
(-1.483) 
0.044 
(4.694) 
0.394 
(6.208) 
1.209 
(26.339) 
0.013 
(6.850) 
0.197 
(8.556) 
2.546 
(15.068) 
-0.895 
(-13.543) 
0.860 
(7.691) 
-0.532 
(-14.554) 
-7.456 
(-34.081) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.167 
(-6.079) 
-0.008 
(-0.617) 
-0.000 
(-0.018) 
0.735 
(2.033) 
1.761 
(25.404) 
-0.002 
(-0.488) 
0.236 
(3.525) 
1.148 
(1.351) 
-0.659 
(-1.349) 
2.402 
(4.696) 
2.713 
(3.146) 
-9.915 
(-10.512) 
c 
b 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.084 
(-4.268) 
-0.029 
(-3.813) 
0.033 
(2.963) 
0.826 
(4.114) 
1.404 
(29.888)  
0.020 
(5.916) 
0.068 
(1.913) 
2.931 
(4.337) 
0.082 
(0.249) 
1.021 
(2.970) 
0.423 
(1.281) 
-6.279 
(-11.561) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
 
c 
a 
c 
c 
c 
 
-0.088 
(-9.770) 
-0.001 
(-0.416) 
0.022 
(4.084) 
0.188 
(1.156) 
0.485 
(19.968) 
0.015 
(8.847) 
0.004 
(0.284) 
1.151 
(3.857) 
-0.077 
(-0.481) 
0.746 
(4.175) 
-0.220 
(-4.370) 
-2.010 
(-6.502) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
 
-0.026 
(-4.621) 
-0.069 
(-10.218) 
-0.000 
(-0.062) 
0.046 
(4.807) 
0.417 
(6.442) 
1.209 
(26.107) 
0.013 
(6.833) 
0.200 
(8.643) 
2.555 
(15.394) 
-0.907 
(-13.705) 
0.861 
(8.036) 
-0.531 
(-14.248) 
-7.669 
(-33.798) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.023 
(-1.152) 
-0.153 
(-5.151) 
-0.002 
(-0.155) 
0.001 
(0.083) 
0.759 
(2.097) 
1.757 
(25.263) 
-0.002 
(-0.505) 
0.241 
(3.587) 
1.154 
(1.358) 
-0.661 
(-1.355) 
2.368 
(4.626) 
2.669 
(3.106) 
-10.133 
(-10.515) 
 
c 
b 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
  
-0.022 
(-1.676) 
-0.071 
(-3.427) 
-0.024 
(-2.904) 
0.034 
(3.053) 
0.840 
(4.181) 
1.404 
(29.900)  
0.020 
(5.913) 
0.072 
(2.015) 
2.944 
(4.361) 
0.071 
(0.214) 
1.005 
(2.920) 
0.410 
(1.250) 
-6.489 
(-11.735) 
a 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
 
c 
b 
c 
c 
c 
 
-0.015 
(-2.271) 
-0.078 
(-7.723) 
0.001 
(0.389) 
0.023 
(4.214) 
0.202 
(1.240) 
0.485 
(19.961) 
0.015 
(8.854) 
0.006 
(0.401) 
1.156 
(3.872) 
-0.084 
(-0.526) 
0.746 
(4.174) 
-0.220 
(-4.350) 
-2.138 
(-6.728) 
b 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
 
Observations 
Adj. R2 
10,096 
0.363 
4,498 
0.190 
7,081 
0.280 
10,094 
0.167 
10,096 
0.364 
4,498 
0.194 
7,081 
0.281 
10,094 
0.171 
10,096 
0.365 
4,498 
0.194 
7,081 
0.282 
10,094 
0.171 
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Table 5: Changes in ESG Disclosure Following CEO Turnovers 
(t-1)→t 
(1) 
 ESG 
(t-1)→(t+1) (t-1)→(t+2) (t-1)→t 
 Environ 
(t-1)→(t+1) (t-1)→(t+2) (t-1)→t 
 Social 
(t-1)→(t+1) (t-1)→(t+2) (t-1)→t 
 Govnce 
(t-1)→(t+1) (t-1)→(t+2) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CEO Turnover 
CEO Age 
CEO Gender 
CEO Comp 
Ln(Revenue) 
Mkt-to-Bk 
CapEx 
Leverage 
Tangible 
ROS 
Constant 
0.132 
(0.534) 
0.641 
(0.574) 
0.888 
(1.333) 
0.087 
(0.541) 
2.297 
(2.845) 
0.245 
(0.563) 
-1.045 
(-0.306) 
-0.776 
(-0.548) 
0.471 
(0.099) 
-0.754 
(-1.880) 
-2.466 
(-0.519) 
c
a
0.694 
(1.936) 
2.068 
(1.442) 
1.541 
(2.209) 
0.036 
(0.177) 
1.297 
(2.231) 
0.245 
(0.441) 
-1.063 
(-0.221) 
0.656 
(0.376) 
0.257 
(0.061) 
-0.009 
(-0.021) 
-8.740 
(-1.453) 
a
b
b
1.356 
(2.711) 
1.152 
(0.577) 
2.047 
(2.338) 
0.373 
(1.275) 
1.211 
(2.094) 
-0.332 
(-0.488) 
-0.169 
(-0.031) 
1.886 
(0.717) 
-0.168 
(-0.034) 
-0.023 
(-0.051) 
-5.922 
(-0.707) 
c
b
b
0.105 
(0.130) 
-0.256 
(-0.057) 
3.148 
(1.438) 
-0.660 
(-1.109) 
5.637 
(1.904) 
-1.458 
(-0.554) 
4.481 
(0.351) 
-2.236 
(-0.349) 
2.607 
(0.156) 
2.511 
(0.473) 
-0.222 
(-0.012) 
a
1.765 
(1.693) 
1.411 
(0.246) 
5.098 
(2.184) 
-0.540 
(-0.810) 
3.892 
(1.748) 
-1.495 
(-0.635) 
0.008 
(0.001) 
-8.191 
(-1.124) 
11.617 
(0.656) 
17.919 
(1.760) 
-10.622 
(-0.449) 
a
b
a
a
2.857 
(1.912) 
-5.255 
(-0.713) 
4.667 
(1.746) 
0.207 
(0.241) 
5.888 
(2.073) 
-3.764 
(-1.333) 
3.769 
(0.326) 
-18.364 
(-1.623) 
0.901 
(0.047) 
10.129 
(0.743) 
13.536 
(0.447) 
a
a
b
-0.849 
(-1.623) 
-0.551 
(-0.231) 
2.998 
(3.379) 
-0.237 
(-0.695) 
2.214 
(2.110) 
-0.099 
(-0.085) 
-0.230 
(-0.027) 
-2.727 
(-0.661) 
0.241 
(0.025) 
-1.335 
(-0.317) 
1.046 
(0.105) 
c
b
0.350 
(0.463) 
-2.291 
(-0.719) 
3.739 
(2.565) 
-0.060 
(-0.149) 
2.559 
(1.820) 
0.251 
(0.174) 
6.329 
(0.665) 
-4.439 
(-1.082) 
-2.538 
(-0.249) 
2.072 
(0.405) 
8.172 
(0.612) 
b
a
1.505 
(1.391) 
-4.164 
(-0.876) 
4.435 
(2.966) 
0.551 
(0.872) 
2.735 
(1.921) 
-1.971 
(-1.426) 
2.687 
(0.290) 
3.875 
(0.684) 
-7.542 
(-0.651) 
1.228 
(0.309) 
15.617 
(0.790) 
c
a
0.296 
(1.176) 
0.169 
(0.149) 
-0.585 
(-0.774) 
0.696 
(2.376) 
0.639 
(0.938) 
0.098 
(0.180) 
-1.176 
(-0.439) 
1.317 
(0.798) 
-3.462 
(-0.793) 
0.493 
(0.866) 
0.415 
(0.083) 
b
0.518 
(1.856) 
-0.093 
(-0.074) 
-0.708 
(-0.763) 
0.460 
(2.109) 
0.352 
(0.739) 
0.013 
(0.021) 
-2.626 
(-1.026) 
0.548 
(0.405) 
-3.355 
(-0.950) 
-0.367 
(-0.553) 
0.142 
(0.026) 
a
b
0.461 
(1.87) 
-0.674 
(-0.370) 
-0.264 
(-0.201) 
0.311 
(1.041) 
0.309 
(0.726) 
-0.058 
(-0.065) 
3.059 
(1.033) 
-0.015 
(-0.007) 
-5.285 
(-1.304) 
0.551 
(1.061) 
1.773 
(0.225) 
a
Observations 
Adj. R2 
1,398 
0.058 
1,074 
0.075 
798 
0.083 
521 
0.098 
399 
0.116 
298 
0.149 
868 
0.067 
677 
0.086 
506 
0.081 
1,397 
0.040 
1,074 
0.057 
798 
0.059 
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This table reports the results of analyses on the changes in ESG scores following a CEO turnover event. CEO turnovers are identified using ExecuComp data. 
Turnover firms are propensity-score matched to firms who do not experience a turnover following the methodology of Weisbach (1988). For each turnover  
and match firm, I compute the change in ESG score and the contemporaneous change in firm characteristics from the fiscal-year before the turnover to the fiscal-
year of [(t-1)→t], the fiscal-year before to the fiscal-year after [(t-1)→(t+1)], and from the fiscal-year before to two fiscal-years after [(t-1)→(t+2)]. All
specifications include fixed effects for fiscal-year of the change and industry using Fama and French (1997) 17-industry classifications and compute robust 
a b cstandard errors clustered by fiscal-year. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Remaining variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. , , and  indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
ESG Score Bloomberg's proprietary score based on the extent of a company's environmental, social, and 
governance disclosure. The score ranges from 0.1 to 100 with higher values reflecting increased 
ESG disclosure. 
Environ Score Bloomberg's proprietary score based on the extent of a company's environmental disclosure. 
Higher values reflect increased environmental disclosure. 
Social Score Bloomberg's proprietary score based on the extent of a company's social disclosure. Higher 
values reflect increased social disclosure. 
Govnce Score Bloomberg's proprietary score based on the extent of a company's governance disclosure. 
Higher values reflect increased governance disclosure. 
CEO Tenure A count of the number of consecutive years an individual has been in the CEO position within 
her respective firm. 
CEO Age The age of the CEO as reported by ExecuComp. 
CEO Comp Total compensation, in millions, for the CEO in a given year. Comprised of the following: 
salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options 
granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total as reported by 
ExecuComp. 
CEO Gender An indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if ExecuComp reports the gender of the CEO as 
male, and 0 otherwise. 
Avg Tenure For each individual-firm combination, I construct a measure of the individual’s tenure by 
counting the number of consecutive years the individual has been with the firm. For each firm, I 
then take the average tenure in a given year to construct a measure of the average tenure of the 
firm's top-five executives. 
Avg Age The average age of a firm's top-five executives in a given year as reported by ExecuComp. 
Revenue The total revenue, in billions, at fiscal year-end as reported by Compustat. 
Firm Age The number of years the firm has existed in Compustat. 
Market-to-Book The market value of a firm's equity at the fiscal-year end scaled by its book value of equity. 
CapEx The capital expenditures for a firm at fiscal-year end scaled by the firm's total revenues. 
Leverage The total long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt scaled by the book value of 
total assets. 
Tangible Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by the book value of total assets. 
ROS EBIT scaled by total revenue. 
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